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I. INTRODUCTION
James Watson and Francis Crick "unraveled" the structure of
2DNA in 1953. Since then, DNA typing (profiling, fingerprinting,
testing) has overcome controversy and criticism and revolutionized
the criminal justice system.3 In the process, DNA testing has freed
at least sixty-three innocent men originally convicted of murder or
4rape.
When DNA analysis was first introduced, prosecutors sought to
use the testing to confirm they had the right man and ultimately in-
troduce the results at trial to increase the chances of securing a
guilty verdict. Since first being used by prosecutors, the technology
has significantly advanced, and more sophisticated DNA testing is
now available. As a result, there are numerous inmates across the
country that did not have this testing available to them at the time
of their convictions and are now attempting to gain access to DNA
profiling to prove their innocence. Allowing an inmate access to
post-conviction DNA testing has drawn criticism from some in the
legal community, support from some against the death penalty and
raised numerous legal issues. This comment will first explore the
history of DNA analysis/testing and its introduction into the court-
room.5 Then it will discuss the legal issues surrounding a defen-
6dant's request for post-conviction DNA testing. It will go on to ex-
plore post-conviction testing in Minnesota. Finally, this comment
will discuss various steps being taken to provide a defendant with
the right to post-conviction DNA testing.8
2. Denise A. Filocoma, Comment, Unraveling the DNA Controversy: People v.
Wesley, A Step in the Right Direction, 3J.L. & POL'Y 537, 540 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Robert Tanner, Death Row Releases Raise Issues of Justice, DETROIT NEWS,
Feb. 9, 2000, at A9, available at http://www.detnews.com/2000/nation/0002
/09/02090161.htm. Illinois is responsible for fourteen post-conviction DNA ex-
onerations and New York is responsible for seven. Alicia Montgomery, Angels of
Justice (Mar. 17, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/03/17/
scheck/index.html.
5. Infta Part II.
6. Infra Part IV.
7. Infta Part V.
8. Infra Part VI.
1972 [Vol. 27:3
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II. THE HISTORY OF DNA ANALYSIS AND ITS INTRODUCTION IN THE
COURTROOM
Early forms of biological identification techniques were often
referred to as unreliable.9 For example, one method of testing
used in the 1960's was called "genetic marker analysis."' ° This form
of analysis was effective only on certain blood types, which did not
make genetic marker analysis a valuable form of testing in most cir-
cumstances." Additionally, the testing was unsuccessful in most
12cases due to deterioration of the sample. Furthermore, it was pos-
sible the genetic marker analysis would result in a false conclu-
sion. Another early form of scientific analysis was the electropho-
retic method of testing that typed polymorphic proteins.' 4 Again,
this method resulted in inconsistent results.
DNA analysis of hair, saliva, blood, skin tissue and semen is the
16most significant advance in the history of scientific evidence. De-
oxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") "codes genetic information for the
transmission of inherited traits." 7 The function of DNA is to store
all information necessary to create a human being along with all
traits unique to that human being." The two most common types
of DNA tests are Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism
Analysis ("RFLP") and Polymerase Chain Reaction Amplification
9. Infra notes 10-15.
10. NAT. INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, CONVICTED
BYJURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xv (1996) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PUB. No. 161258]. The names of the tests used were the Lattes test, the absorption-
elution test and the absorption-inhibition test. Id.
11. Id. Only ABO blood group substances and ABO isoantibodies could be
detected. Id. ABO typing, which is a form of electrophoresis testing, was used to
obtain the conviction of Joseph O'Dell. Lori Urs, Commonwealth v. Joseph O'Dell:
Truth and Justice or Confuse the Courts? The DNA Controversy, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 311, 315 (1999). O'Dell was executed despite the contro-
versy surrounding the reliability or lack thereof of the testing used. Id. at 315.
12. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at xv.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Urs, supra note 11, at 312-13.
16. U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at xv, xix, 4.
17. David Williams, DNA Evidence Presents Opportunities and Challenges for
Criminal Lawyers, at http://www.cnn.com/LAW/ trials.and.cases/case.files/0006/
deathpenalty/dnaincourt.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2001). See also Deborah F.
Barfield, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting-Justifying the Special Need for the Fourth
Amendment's Intrusion Into the Zone of Privacy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 27, 8 (2000).
18. Barfield, supra note 17, at 8.
2001] 1973
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Analysis ("PCR").' 9 Additionally, the newest form of DNA testing
used is referred to as STR testing ("short tandem repeat" polymor-
phisms) .20
Use of DNA testing to obtain a criminal conviction first oc-
curred in Great Britain in 1986 where Colin Pitchfork became the
first person convicted on DNA evidence.2' The first conviction in
the United States based on DNA evidence occurred in 1988 in An-
22drews v. State. However, it was not easy for DNA to make its way
into the courtroom. From the beginning, DNA analysis and its use
in the courtroom struggled to gain acceptance. Reluctance to ac-
cept the testing and allow DNA in the courtroom resulted mainly
23from the lack of reliability in the early form of tests.
The first significant obstacle DNA analysis had to overcome
was the admissibility of such scientific evidence in a criminal pro-
24ceeding. Beginning in 1923, the federal courts followed the stan-
19. NAT. INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 26-
27(1999) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626]. RFLP testing was
developed by Alec Jeffreys of Leicester University in 1985. Id. at 26. PCR testing
was developed by Dr. Kary Mullis in 1984. Id. at 27. PCR testing can generate reli-
able results from very small amounts of DNA. Id. Both forms of testing are widely
used and accepted in the courts. Id.
20. Ronald Bailey, Unlocking the Cells, Reason Online (Jan. 2000), at
http://www. reason.com/0001/fe.rb.unlocking.html.
21. Filocoma, supra note 2, at 567 n.18; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No.
177626, supra note 19, at 1. Dr. Alec J.Jeffreys worked with police on this case. Id.
But see U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at 4 (stating Robert
Melias was the first person convicted primarily on DNA evidence in 1987).
22. 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The prosecutor presented DNA
fingerprint evidence at trial and the trial court admitted the evidence. Id. at 842.
At the time of Andrews' appeal, there were no prior appellate court decisions re-
garding the admissibility of DNA. Id. at 843. The admissibility of DNA was upheld.
Id. at 850.
23. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
24. See generally United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 786 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(conducting eight days of pretrial hearings on the admissibility of DNA profiling,
the court allowed the results to be presented to the jury); United States v. Gaines,
979 F. Supp. 1429, 1430 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (requiring government to make showing
under Daubert as precondition to the admissibility of PCR DNA analysis); United
States v. Young, 754 F. Supp 739, 741 (D.S.D. 1990) (determining the admissibility
of DNA evidence includes considering whether the evidence is generally accepted
in the scientific community, whether testing procedures used were generally ac-
cepted as reliable, whether the tests were performed properly, whether evidence is
more prejudicial than probative, and whether the statistics used are more proba-
tive than prejudicial); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 422 (Minn. 1989) (hold-
ing DNA test results are admissible if performed in accordance with appropriate
1974 [Vol. 27:3
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25
dard set in Frye v. United States. The Frye standard, which applies to
all scientific evidence, stated that in order for scientific evidence to
be admissible, the evidence had to be generally accepted by the sci-
entific community in which it was relevant.26 Even though Frye was
a federal holding, the standard was adopted by most jurisdictions,
27including Minnesota. In 1993 the Supreme Court abandoned Frye
and adopted the Daubert standard. 8 Daubert moved to a standard
29that required the evidence to be relevant and reliable.
Since the development of the Frye and Daubert standards, most
jurisdictions have addressed the issue of admissibility of DNA tests
on one level or another.3° The West Virginia Supreme Court was
the first state supreme court to rule on the admissibility of DNA
analysis.1 Additionally, one of the first courts to challenge the ad-
missibility of DNA was the New York Supreme Court in People v.
32Castro. Since its inception, scientists have made significant ad-
vances in DNA analysis, which have resulted in its increased accep-
tance in the criminal justice system.33 "The state of the profiling
laboratory standards and controls); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 985 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding the admissibility of DNA is dependent upon findings that
the expert performed scientifically accepted tests and used generally accepted
techniques).
25. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
26. Id. at 1014. "[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testi-
mony deducted from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
27. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
28. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (overruling the
Frye standard, the court held "general acceptance" is not necessary).
29. Id. at 597. The Federal Rules of Evidence preclude Frye, thus, the Rules
provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Id.
The standard is that the evidence must be both relevant and reliable. Id.
30. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at 6-7. Forty-six
states admit DNA evidence in criminal proceedings; in three states (Nevada, Okla-
homa and Tennessee) statutes require admission; and forty-three states have ruled
on the technology. Id.
31. State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 259 (W. Va. 1989). The court held DNA
typing analysis was reliable, generally acceptable and, therefore, admissible. Id. at
260.
32. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). The Castro court used a three-
prong test to determine admissibility: the proposed DNA testing must be generally
accepted in the scientific community; the laboratory techniques must be generally
accepted in the scientific community; and the laboratory must have performed the
tests in accordance with the accepted scientific techniques. Id. at 987. The DNA
tests were found inadmissible for failure to satisfy the third prong. Id. at 997-98.
33. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at 1.
2001] 1975
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technology and the methods for estimating frequencies and related
statistics have progressed to the point where the admissibility of
properlL collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in
doubt." To date, DNA test results are admissible in all jurisdic-
tions s5
When DNA testing was introduced to the criminal justice
scene, prosecutors saw it as a powerful tool to assist in the convic-
tion and incarceration of the guilty. Over the last few years, DNA
analysis has become a powerful tool to the defense to exonerate
those who have already been convicted. Using DNA testing at the
post-conviction stage is a controversial issue that raises both proce-
dural and substantive questions.
III. POST-CONVICTION TESTING To THE FOREFRONT
Post-conviction DNA testing moved to the forefront and be-
came a prominent legal issue in 1996. It was in 1996 that the U.S.
Department of Justice published a report that detailed the stories
of twenty-eight men who had been exonerated through post-
conviction DNA testing.16 These twenty-eight men served a total of
34. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at 6.
35. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at 1.
36. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at 2. The twenty-
eight cases were tried in fourteen states and the District of Columbia. Most cases
took place in the 1980's, the earliest in 1979 and the most recent in 1991. All
twenty-eight cases involved some form of sexual assault; six also included murder.
All alleged assailants were men and all victims were women. All but one was tried
before ajury. Police had knowledge of fifteen defendants prior to their arrests. Id.
at 12-14. Since the publication of the report, more than forty similar cases have
been identified. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at iii. Clyde
Charles was set free December 17, 1999, after nineteen years behind bars after
DNA testing showed he was innocent of the rape he was convicted of. Richard
Zitrin, DNA Clears Man of Rape, Points to Brother, at http://www. apbnews.com/
newscenter/breakingnews/20.. ./dna041l_01.html (n.d.). Neil J. Miller served
ten years behind bars for a rape and robbery that he was ultimately cleared of after
DNA testing proved his innocence. Susan Wessling, Man Cleared After Decade in
Prison, at http://www.apbnews.com/newscenter/bre.../dnarelease 0511_01.html
(n.d.). DNA testing was not available at the time of his trial. Id. Kevin Lee Green
was released after spending seventeen years in prison for murdering his wife and
unborn child when DNA confirmed another man had committed the crime. U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at 32. A.B. Butler spent sixteen
years in a Texas prison before being released this year after DNA tests confirmed
his innocence. Sharon Cohen & Paul Shepard, DNA Tests Clear Scores of Felons,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 8, 2000, at A29. After sixteen years in prison, DNA
tests recently proved Carlos Lavernia's innocence. Lisa Falkenberg, Judge: DNA
Clears Rape Convict, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 11, 2000. Carlos is still in prison
1976 [Vol. 27:3
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197 years in prison for crimes they did not commit.37 Three of the
twenty-eight men were sentenced to die, including Kirk Bloods-
worth who became the first death row inmate in the United States
38to be released based on post-conviction DNA testing. Bloods-
worth and the other twenty-seven men owe their releases to the
technological advancements of DNA analysis and to the willingness
of the courts to create a procedural process by which the convict
was allowed to pursue post-conviction testing in the first place.
The findings in the U.S. Department of Justice report alarmed
both the scientific community and the criminal justice system.39
Further, it caused Attorney General Janet Reno to establish the Na-
tional Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence. 40 The early re-
quests for post-conviction testing left jurisdictions scrambling to
develop a procedure for handling post-conviction DNA testing re-
quests. While some jurisdictions are in the process of developing
statutes to handle requests, Arizona, Illinois, Minnesota, New York,
Oklahoma and Washington currently have statutes in place that
specifically address post-conviction DNA testing.4'
awaiting a final decision on whether or not he will be released from court. Id.
37. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at 12. The longest
time served was eleven years and the shortest was nine months. Id.
38. Id. at 13-14. The three men are Kirk Bloodsworth, Rolando Cruz and Ale-
jandro Hernandez. Id. When Kirk Bloodsworth was found innocent, the State of
Maryland paid him $300,000 for wrongful imprisonment. Raju Chebium, Kirk
Bloodsworth, Twice Convicted of Rape and Murder, Exonerated by DNA Evidence, at
http://www. cnn.com/2000/LAW/06/20/bloodsworth.profile/.
39. The fact that twenty-eight real people were innocent, yet were convicted,
could not be ignored. The report clearly demonstrated that our criminal justice
system is less than perfect. Post-conviction DNA testing is what is used to correct
the injustices that occurred, but what flaws in the system caused the wrongful con-
victions to happen in the first place? Mistaken eyewitness identification, coerced
confessions, unreliable forensic laboratory work, law enforcement conduct and
ineffective representation of counsel all contribute to wrongful convictions. U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at xxx.
40. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at iii.
41. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (West 2000); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-
3(a) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (1996); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 440.30(1-
a)(McKinney Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1371.1 (West 2000); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West 2000). In 1994, New York was the first state to
implement a law dealing directly with post-conviction DNA testing. Development in
Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1557,
1573 (1995) [hereinafter Development in Law] (referring to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
440.30(1-a) (McKinney Supp. 1995)). New York's statute applies only to inmates
convicted prior to 1996. Id. Additionally, the statute does not allow any convict
access to testing. Id. The statute states that testing shall be granted if evidence
containing DNA was collected in connection with the conviction and there must
20011 1977
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IV. THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED WHEN AN INMATE MAKES A REQUEST
FOR POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING
A. How Does A Request Fit Into The Procedural Process?
Despite the numerous requests by inmates for post-conviction
DNA testing, courts are still struggling with how to classify such a
request. One of the first courts to wrestle with the issue was in New
York in Dabbs v. Vergari.41 Since then, other jurisdictions have strug-
gled with requests for post-conviction DNA testing.43 Whether the
request is viewed as an exculpatory evidence issue or a newly dis-
covered evidence issue, certain standards need to be adopted for
use by trial courts in determining when, or if, a defendant should
be allowed to obtain the post-conviction testing.44
Due to the lack of precedent courts have to follow, requests for
post-conviction DNA testing have generally been handled on a case-
by-case basis.45 Procedurally, requests for post-conviction testing
be a reasonable chance that the verdict would have been more favorable to the
defendant if DNA tests had been conducted at the time of the trial. Id. Tennessee
is another state that has passed a law allowing for some post-conviction testing.
Richard A. Oppel Jr., States Move Towards Easing Obstacles to DNA Testing, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2000, at A8. California allows inmates to seek testing if the DNA
testing technology was not available at trial and requires officals to preserve bio-
logical evidence. Id. Texas recently introduced legislation similar to California.
Id. In Washington the statute allows testing only to those on death row or serving
life sentences without parole. Id. Further, it is left to the prosecutors discretion
whether to allow the testing in the first place. Id.
42. 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. 1990). The court held Dabbs was allowed to con-
duct post-conviction DNA testing. Id. at 769. The court treated such a request as a
post-conviction motion for discovery. Id. at 767. The DNA tests confirmed Dabbs
was not the right person. Id. at 769. The Supreme Court of Westchester County,
New York, decided on first impression that a technological advance of DNA analy-
sis nine years after trial that rendered exculpatory results justified vacating Dabb's
conviction. People v. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (N.Y. 1991).
43. See generally State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 252-53 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (granting defendant opportunity to conduct post-trial DNA testing based on
scientific and judicial developments of the last several years); Sewell v. State, 592
N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (considering the implications of Brady in
holding defendant entitled to discover rape kit to conduct post-conviction testing
because the testing was not available at trial); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d
420, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (vacating conviction to allow defendant to conduct
DNA analysis); People v. Callace, 573 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (N.Y. 1991) (classifying the
testing as newly discovered evidence).
44. Mebane v. State, 902 P.2d 494, 497 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
45. Development in Law, supra note 41, at 1572.
1978 [Vol. 27:3
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have been treated in one of three ways by the court.46 First, the de-
fendant can bring a motion for a new trial based on newly discov-
ered evidence. 47 Second, the defendant can bring a habeas peti-
tion.4" A third possibility is that a defendant can claim that he has a
right to exculpatory evidence. Each potential procedure for han-
dling post-conviction DNA testing requests presents its own set of
legal issues and procedural roadblocks.
1. Newly Discovered Evidence
One procedural path some courts have followed is to classify
post-conviction DNA testing as "newly discovered evidence., 49 For
50example, in People v. Callace, the New York court reasoned post-
conviction DNA testing should be classified as newly discovered
evidence because the type of DNA analysis available at the post-
conviction stage was not available at the time of the trial, therefore
making 5the evidence "new."5' Similar reasoning followed in Mebane
v. State. Furthermore, New York has taken the lead and has writ-
ten directly into their statute that post-conviction DNA test results
should be classified as newly discovered evidence.53
Even in jurisdictions where courts have taken the first step and
classified post-conviction testing as "newly discovered evidence,"
the testing is not easy to obtain. The application of "newly discov-
ered evidence" to post-conviction DNA testing is a very narrow one.
The narrow application makes it challenging for inmates to get the
post-conviction DNA testing based on the theory of newly discov-
ered evidence. This is especially the case in situations where some
form of testing was available at trial and the defense did not use it.
For example, in Whitsel v. State 4 the court found the post-conviction
testing not to be newly discovered evidence because the defendant
46. Id,
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Mebane, 902 P.2d at 497; People v. Callace, 573 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (N.Y.
1991).
50. 573 N.Y.S.2d 137(N.Y. 1991).
51. Id. at 139.
52. 902 P.2d at 497.
53. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 440.10 Subd. l(g), 440.30 Subd. 1-a (McKinney
1995).
54. 525 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1994).
2001] 1979
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did not use the testing that was available at the time of the trial
56Similarly, in People v. Kellar the court was unwilling to grant a new
trial because it found the post-conviction request for testing was not
new evidence due to the fact that the defendant was fully aware ofS 51
the testing at trial.
According to the Iowa Supreme Court, newly discovered evi-
dence must be relevant and likely to change the outcome of the58
case. Furthermore, the court looks upon motions for new trials
based on post-conviction DNA evidence with disfavor and does not
grant motions liberally.
59
A disadvantage to treating motions for post-conviction DNA
testing as "newly discovered" evidence is timing. In thirty-three
states, inmates have six months or less to file a motion based on
new evidence. 60 In Minnesota, for example, a defendant must
bring a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
61within fifteen days of the verdict. In most cases involving a re-
quest for post-conviction DNA testing, years have passed since their
conviction, not months. Reasons for such short time periods in
which to file a motion include the strong presumption that the
verdict is correct due to the fact that the individual was convicted
by ajury, the need for finality, the recognition that memories fade,
witnesses disappear, and finally the need to conserve judicial re-
sources by not opening the floodgates to meritless and costly
62claims. Therefore, in most circumstances if the time limit has
passed for filing a motion, it is beyond the scope of the court's au-
thority and the court will not have the authority to order the test-
ing.63 One possible solution set forth in "Recommendations for
Handling Requests" is to waive the time limit to file a motion based
on new evidence in circumstances where the newly discovered evi-
dence is DNA.64 Further, the commission encourages prosecutors
and judges to waive the time limit on a motion for a new trial based
55. Id. at 863.
56. 605 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. 1993).
57. Id.
58. Whitsel, 525 N.W.2d at 863.
59. Id.
60. Oppel, supra note 41.
61. MINN. R. CRiM. P. 26.04 (West 2000).
62. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at 9.
63. Development in Law, supra note 41, at 1572.
64. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at 54; Bailey, supra
note 20.
1980 [Vol. 27:3
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65
on new evidence in certain circumstances. The court should not
waive the time limit in all circumstances, but rather scrutinize each
request individually, especially if there have been significant ad-
vances in technology since the conviction.
2. Does A Defendant Have A Constitutional Right To Demonstrate
Actual Innocence Through Habeas Corpus Review?
Essential to the discussion of habeas corpus petition and how it
relates to a motion for post-conviction DNA testing is the holding
in Herrera v. Collins.66
The issue in Herrera was whether a freestanding claim of inno-
cence could be raised in a habeas corpus petition in view of either
the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel or unusual pun-
ishment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.67 Herrera claimed he could prove, through newly discovered
evidence that he was actually innocent.6 The Herrera court held
that a claim of actual innocence absent a constitutional claim is not
cognizable under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. 69
The rule is that newly discovered evidence claims are not
grounds for federal habeas corpus relief absent an independent
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding. ° "The rule is grounded in the principle that federal
habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in
violation of the constitution-not to correct errors of fact."'7
Herera has provided guidance to courts faced with claims of
actual innocence grounded in post-conviction DNA testing. How-
ever, some courts have departed from the holding in Herrera. In
People v. Washington,72 the court addressed the issue of a constitu-
65. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, at 54; Bailey, supra
note 20.
66. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Herrera was convicted of murdering police officer
Carrisalez and sentenced to death in 1982. Id. at 393. Ten years after his convic-
tion and after one habeas petition, Herrera filed another habeas petition claiming
actual innocence. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 396.
69. Id. at 400.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 665 N.E.2d 1330 (I11. 996). Washington, who was convicted of murder,
filed a post-conviction motion under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
claiming newly discovered evidence. Id. at 1332.
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tional right implicated in a freestanding claim of innocence based
upon new evidence at the post-conviction stage." The court ana-
lyzed this issue under the federal habeas corpus and the Illinois
state constitution. The Illinois court followed Herrera with respect
to federal habeas corpus, but found that as a matter of Illinois con-
stitutional jurisprudence, newly discovered evidence showing a de-
fendant is actually innocent of the crime for which he was con-
74victed is cognizable as a matter of due process.
In Summerville v. Warden,75 the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held habeas corpus permits granting of a new trial pursuant to a
petitioner's claim of actual innocence, notwithstanding a showin
of a constitutional violation that affected fairness of criminal trial.
When evidence is so strong that innocence is highly likely and that
evidence alone establishes innocence that should form in itself, a
basis for habeas review of convictions and imprisonment.77
78In State v. E-Tabech, the time had passed to bring a motion for
a new trial so the defendant tried to bring a habeas corpus petition,
which was denied.79 El-Tabech alleged his constitutional right to
due process would be denied if he were unable to have DNA fin-
gerprint testing conducted on the evidence."s Contrary to the
courts in Washington and Summerville, the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska held the defendant could not bring a request under the
post-conviction statute for DNA testing that would allegedly show
actual innocence in absence of a showing of a constitutional viola-
73. Id. at 1332-37.
74. Id. at 1337.
75. 641 A.2d 1356 (Conn. 1994). Defendant was convicted of manslaughter
in the first degree. Id. at 1358 n.1. The appellate court confirmed conviction. Id.
at 1362. Summerville brought a habeas corpus petition claiming he was deprived
of his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and he alleged in-
effectiveness of counsel. Id. The habeas court rejected his claims and he ap-
pealed. Id. at 1364. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded in part. Id. at 1356.
76. Id. at 1369.
77. Development in Law, supra note 41, at 1582.
78. 610 N.W.2d 737 (Neb. 2000). El-Tabech was convicted of first-degree
murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Id. at 742. El-Tabech filed a post-
conviction motion alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. The trial court dismissed the
motion, and the appellate court upheld the dismissal. Id.
79. Id. at 745. A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
must be brought within three years from the date of the verdict. NEB. REv. STAT. §
29-2101 (1995).
80. El-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d at 743.
1982 [Vol. 27:3
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non."
The case ofJoseph O'Dell is yet another example of the incon-
sistencies demonstrated throughout jurisdictions when it comes to
deciding whether a habeas petition should be granted solely on a
82claim of innocence. After various procedural steps, O'Dell peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the Federal District Court of
Virginia.8 ' The court granted his petition, which was based solely
84on a claim of actual innocence. However, the reasoning for the
court accepting his claim of actual innocence is misleading. It was
not because the court believed such a claim should be heard under
a habeas corpus petition such as in Washington and Summerville.
Rather, it was a statement issued by three Supreme Court justices
that encouraged the court to hear his claims.85 Then O'Dell ap-
pealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals where the court
stated a claim of actual innocence was "not even colorable. 86 Fur-
thermore, O'Dell appealed to the Supreme Court and the court re-
fused to hear his argument on actual innocence.87
In some respects, the system is working towards obtaining jus-
tice by allowing post-conviction DNA testing in some circum-
stances. At the same time the system is taking what little opportu-
nity a convict may have for justice away. Congress passed an anti-
terrorism bill, which severely curtailed the right to obtain post-
conviction habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. Therefore,
81. Id. at 749.
82. Urs, supra note 11, at 316.
83. Id. O'Dell had previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach which was dismissed. Id. O'Dell then ap-
pealed to Virginia Supreme Court, which dismissed his appeal. O'Dell's writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was also denied. Id.
84. Id. Although the Supreme Court denied O'Dell's petition for writ of cer-
tiorari,Justices Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor did issue a statement expressing
concern for O'Dell's matter. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 317.
87. Id.
88. The bill provides:
Strict time limits for filing a writ (1 year in non-death cases, 3 months in
death cases) have been set for filing the writ; [sltate court factual find-
ings are "presumed to be correct"; [s] tate court misinterpretations of the
United States Constitution are not a basis for relief unless those misin-
terpretations are "unreasonable"; and all petitioners must show, prior to
obtaining a hearing, facts sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder
would have found the petitioner guilty.
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the holding in Herrera and the anti-terrorism bill work against a
convict's chance of gaining the right to post-conviction DNA testing
through a habeas petition.
3. Is There A Constitutional Right Under Brady?
89
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a defen-
dant had a constitutional right to be informed of exculpatory evi-
dence. 9° In Brady, the court was referring to evidence the state had
before or during trial, not after trial.9 However, a number of
courts have attempted to make the leap even though a request for
post-conviction DNA testing is "potentially exculpatory" rather than
exculpatory and occurs after the trial rather than prior to the trial."
In Sewell v. State,9 the convict argued that principles of funda-
mental fairness required the state to release evidence when the evi-
dence's exculpatory potential was discovered. 94 Relying on the
analysis in Brady, the court agreed that in situations where the state
possesses exculpatory evidence, the evidence is discoverable.95 The
court went on to say the Brady theory should only be relevant in. .. . . 96
cases where conviction rests largely on identification. Similarly,
the court in Commonwealth v. Brson' also cited to Brady and held
the principles of justice required vacation of conviction and re-
mand to trial court for DNA tests when conviction rested primarily
on victim identification."
In Dabbs v. Vergari,99 the court cited Brady, "Notwithstanding
the absence of a statutory right to post-conviction discovery, a de-
fendant has a constitutional right to be informed of exculpatory in-
formation known by the state." °° The New York courts are reach-
U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at xxxi.
89. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
90. Id. at 87.
91. Id. at 84.
92. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 171626, supra note 19, at 11.
93. 592 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. App. 1992).
94. Id. at 707. Sewell made two claims, the first of which was a claim relying
on the language in the Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 5 which provides that pre-
trial and discovery procedures are available in post-conviction proceedings. Id.
95. Id. at 708.
96. Id.
97. 618 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
98. Id. at 449.
99. 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. 1990).
100. Id. at 767.
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ing the same result using different theories. Later, in People v.
Callace, 02 the court rejected Brady, but allowed the testing under
the theory of newly discovered evidence.
103
Whether a defendant tries to obtain post-conviction testing
through a motion for a new trial based upon new evidence, a peti-
tion for habeas corpus, or the Brady argument, procedural uncer-
tainties and inconsistencies exist which could ultimately bar a de-
fendant's last chance to prove his innocence.
B. Under What Circumstances Should Post-Conviction DNA Testing Be
Granted?
Once a court determines how to treat a request for post-
conviction DNA testing, the court's next step is to determine when
a request should be granted. Advocates for post-conviction DNA
testing agree that testing should not be used in all circumstances,
rather only in extraordinary circumstances. "It is only as powerful
as it is relevant in a given scenario.. .it is not a magic bullet in post-
conviction cases."10 4 For example, if the evidence against a defen-
dant is overwhelming and DNA evidence did not play a large part
in the overall conviction, then the post-conviction testing should
not be granted. However, if the prosecution won the conviction on
eyewitness identification alone, then post-conviction testing should
seriously be considered.
Moreover, several jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of
post-conviction DNA testing agree that there are extraordinary cir-
cumstances where the testing should be granted. For example, in
Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Reese,105 the court relied on their
101. See generally Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 765, 767, 769 (N.Y. 1998) (relying on
Brady, court held evidence should be discoverable after trial); People v. Callace,
573 N.Y.S.2d 137, 137 (N.Y. 1991) (holding post-conviction DNA testing should be
treated as newly discovered evidence).
102. 573 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (N.Y. 1991).
103. Id. at 139.
104. Raju Chebium, DNA Provides New Hope for Wrongly Convicted Death Row In-
mates, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/06/16/death.penalty.dna.main/ (June
16, 2000) (quoting Chris Asplen, Executive Director of the National Commission
on the Future of DNA Evidence, a national group run by the Department of Jus-
tice).
105. 682 A.2d 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). Robinson was convicted of rape and
burglary in a bench trial. Id. at 833. Appellant appealed conviction and conviction
was upheld. Id. Following appeal, Robinson filed a PCRA petition claiming inef-
fectiveness of counsel for failing to request DNA testing. Id. His petition was de-
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earlier decision in Brison and stated that where the conviction
rested on identification evidence, and where advanced technology
could establish conclusive evidence of innocence, the motion for
post-conviction testing should be granted.10 6 Similarly, in Dabbs v.
Vergari, 0 7 the court recognized that the testing Dabbs was request-
ing was not available at the time of trial. The court granted Dabbs
the testing.' 8 Additionally, in Mebane v. State,'09 the court said, "[I]t
seems a matter of fundamental fairness that, under certain circum-
stances, a defendant be able to obtain post-conviction DNA test-
ing."' 0 However, the Mebane court also stated that the defendant
was not entitled to post-conviction DNA testing of evidence as a
matter of right and it should not be granted unless the trial court
determines after a hearing that the result of the test would be po-
tentially exculpatory."'
Instead of constructing a statute to address when and under
what circumstances post-conviction DNA testing should be granted,
112South Dakota developed a set of guidelines in Jenner v. Dooley.
The South Dakota court became one of the few jurisdictions that
established guidelines for when post-conviction DNA testing should
be authorized. The guidelines set forth three elements that needed
to be satisfied. First, the evidence and test results must meet the
Daubert standard."' Second, the inmate must demonstrate that a
favorable result using the latest scientific procedures would most
likely produce an acquittal in a new trial. Third, testing should
not be allowed if it imposes an unreasonable burden on the state."'Recently, the court asserted these same guidelines in Davi v.
nied and Robinson appealed to Superior Court. Id.
106. Id. at 837.
107. 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. 1990).
108. Id. at 769.
109. 902 P.2d 494 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). Ajury convicted Mebane of burglary,
rape, kidnapping and sodomy. Id. at 494-95. Mebane brought motion to request
post-conviction testing of rape kit-request was denied. Id. at 494. DNA testing was
not available at time of trial. Id. at 495. Mebane is the first case where the Kansas
Appellate Court has addressed a defendant's right to post-conviction DNA testing.
Id. at 497.
110. Id.
111. Id. at494.
112. 590 N.W.2d 463, 472 (S.D. 1999).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
1986 [Vol. 27:3
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Class."6 A Nebraska court in State v. El-Tabech also recognized the• r 117
guidelines set injenner.
As shown by the cases discussed above, courts are all over the
board when it comes to deciding if a motion for post-conviction
DNA testing should be granted. Moreover, it's not only the courts
that can procedurally bar a defendant's right to post-conviction
DNA testing, but prosecutors as well. Prosecutors are still skeptical
of allowing post-conviction DNA tests. Prosecutors are encouraged
to view requests with "great suspicion" for several reasons. First,
prosecutors are concerned about a statute allowing any convict the
right to post-conviction DNA testing-this would open the flood-
gates and encourage any convicted criminal to seek DNA testing,
innocent or not."8 Secondly, the principal of finality is important.. . . .119
in our criminal justice system. If courts are inconsistently decid-
ing if post-conviction DNA testing should be granted and prosecu-
tors are still skeptical about allowing the testing in the first place,
the chances a convict will be granted the testing are once again not
promising.
However, suggestions have been made to the courts on ways to
evaluate each situation to determine whether post-conviction test-
ing should be granted. First, when examining each request the
court should consider whether the requested form of testing was
available at the time of the convict's trial, whether significant
strides in accuracy have been made since the judgment, and
whether the technology is sufficiently advanced at the present time
to justify a high degree of confidence in the results. The sugges-
tions, if followed, could help to minimize the inconsistencies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and help to develop a precedent that
can be followed in the future.
With biological evidence such as DNA testing, the courts have
found post-conviction testing most suitable and beneficial to all
116. 609 N.W.2d 107, 112-13 (S.D. 2000) (applying the guidelines set in Jen-
ner).
117. Justice Gerrard stated:
[A] showing must be made that if the matter were presently tried, the de-
fendant would be entitled to the testing and the results would be admis-
sible ... and it must be shown that a favorable result using the latest scien-
tific procedures would most likely produce an acquittal in a new trial.
State v. EI-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d at 750 (Neb. 2000).
118. Oppel, supra note 41.
119. Id.
120. Development in Law, supra note 41, at 1574.
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parties involved when the following elements are present: when the
identity of a single perpetrator is at issue; the prosecution's evi-
dence against the defendant is weak and therefore there is an ele-
ment of real doubt of guilt; scientific evidence, if any, used to ob-
tain the conviction has been impugned; and the nature of
biological evidence make testing results on the issue of identity vir-
tually dispositive.1
2
1
When courts are faced with the question of whether testing
should be granted, the definitive question is, "do the tests carry any
potential for showing exculpatory results?' 2 2 If the results are not
likely to have an impact on the verdict then the request for testing
should be denied. However, if the answer is yes, the courts
should strongly consider granting the request.
C. What Happens When Post-Conviction Testing Proves To Be
Exculpatory ?
The procedural uncertainties do not end once an inmate is
granted post-conviction DNA testing. Courts are unclear and in-
consistent when it comes to addressing post-conviction exculpatory
DNA test results.12  For example, Ronald Cotton spent nearly
eleven years in prison before being exonerated based on post-
conviction DNA testing.2 5 He was cleared of all charges, released
and received $5,000 from the state. 1 6 In State v. Thomas, 27 Thomas
was granted post-conviction DNA testing. The court clearly stated
that the next procedural step would depend on the outcome. If the
results confirmed guilt, the conviction would stand. 29 However, if
the results were exculpatory, the court could either conduct a mo-
121. Jennerv. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 472 (S.D. 1999).
122. People v. Tookes, 639 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (N.Y. 1996).
123. Id.
124. See generally State v. Passino, 640 A.2d 547, 552 (Vt. 1994) (testing of DNA
concluded two bloodstains did not match victim and two were inconclusive and as
a result convict was granted new trial); Urs, supra note 11, at 322 (O'Dell did not
receive a new trial despite testing that showed bloodstains were not that of the vic-
tims and some were inconclusive).
125. Barfield, supra note 17, at 11.
126. Id. Ronald Cotton has since become friends with the woman who was so
sure he was her attacker. For more on this story see Helen O'Neill, Perfect Witness,
MINNEAPOLIS STARTPIB., Sept. 24, 2000, at A29.
127. 586 A.2d 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
128. Id. at 254.
129. Id.
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tion in limine hearing on admissibility or order a new trial."' 0 In
some cases, once the exculpatory results are known, the defense
moves for a new trial, the prosecutors decline to re-try the case, and
the defendant is released. In other cases, prosecutors decide to
pursue a second trial. 1
2
In the interest of justice, once test results prove exculpatory,
the inmate should be released from prison. It should be that sim-
ple, but it is not. Contrary to what seems right, release from prison
is not always simultaneous with exculpatory, post-conviction DNA
test results. 133 For example, Ronald Jones post-conviction testing
showed he was innocent of the crime, but he remained in prison
on death row for some time following the exculpatory test results.
Until recently, Earl WashingtonJr. was still in prison.3 5 In 1994 his
death sentence was commuted to life in prison when another DNA
test strongly suggested, but did not prove his innocence. 136 Gover-
nor James Gilmore ordered new DNA tests in June of this year.131
This time the DNA tests confirmed Washington's innocence and
Gilmore granted Washington a full pardon. 138 Yet another example
is Roy Wayne Criner who was denied a new trial after DNA tests
showed he was not the source of semen found in the victim. 39 De-
130. Id.
131. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at 35, 40, 42.
132. Id. at 49. Prosecutors decided to pursue second trial against Gerald
Wayne Davis. Id.
133. Infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
134. Ky Henderson, How Many Innocent Inmates Are Executed?, 24 HuM. RTS. Q
10, 11 (1997). Since Henderson's report, Ronald Jones has been released from
prison. Sharon Cohen & Paul Shepard, DNA Test Clears Scores of Felons, MINNEAPO-
LIS STA TRIB., Oct. 8, 2000, at A29. Ronald Jones was the twelfth inmate released
from death row in the state of Illinois and the sixty-fourth person in the United
States to be exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing. Judge Josephine Linker
Hart & Guilford M. Dudley, Available Post-Trial Relief After a State Criminal Conviction
When Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes "Actual Innocence, "22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 629, 631 (2000).
135. Frank Green, DNA Could Clear Rape, Murder Convict, at http://www.
apbnews.com/newscenter... /virginiatests 0418_01.html (n.d.). In addition to
serving time for a murder he did not commit, Earl Washington is currently serving
a thirty-year sentence for breaking and entering and the beating of a seventy year
old woman. Nick Goldberg, Wrongfully Convicted?, at http://www. abcnews.go.com
/onair/Nig.. ./nl000814_CapitalPunishmentEjWashingtonUpdate.htm (n.d.).
136. Green, supra note 135.
137. Goldberg, supra note 135.
138. Associated Press, Virginia Inmate Cleared by DNA Tests Gets Pardon (October
2, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/10/02/dnatest.pardon.ap.
139. Cohen & Shepard, supra note 134, at A29.
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spite the exculpatory results, the judge in the case reasoned that he
could have worn a condom.'4 Two years later more DNA tests were
conducted, and again showed Criner was innocent.141 In August,
after ten years in prison, Governor George W. Bush pardoned Roy
142Wayne Criner.
New York is one of the few states, if not the only state, that has
a statute addressing what a court can do when post-conviction DNA
test results prove exculpatory. The statute provides the court
with the authority to vacate a judgment when the DNA evidence "is
of such a character as to create a probability that had such evidence
been received at trial the verdict would have been more favorable
to the defendant."144 The criminal justice system is beginning to
understand the importance and the urgency in establishing proce-
dures for granting the testing. Additionally, adopting a standard
procedure for handling exculpatory results is just as important.
V. POST-CONVICTION TESTING IN MINNESOTA
A. Admissibility Of DNA Evidence
As early as 1952, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged
the federal standard set in Frye v. United States. 45 In 1980, Minne-
sota established an additional factor incorporating the Fye stan-
dard to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. The
result was a two-part test. The first part of the test concentrated on
acceptance within the relevant scientific community (the Frye stan-
dard) . 47 The second part was developed from the case State v.
Mack and required additional proof of reliability. Because of the
two-part test, the standard is often referred to as the Frye/Mack
standard in Minnesota.
In 1993, the Supreme Court abandoned Frye and moved to the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 440.10(1) (g) (McKinney 1995).
144. People v. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (1991).
145. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). See generally State v. Kolander, 52 N.W.2d 458,
465 (Minn. 1952) (determining whether or not lie detector test was admissible, the
court applied Frye).
146. Steven Terry, Development, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 237, 241 (1996).
147. Id.
148. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); Terry, supra note 146, at 241.
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Daubert standard. 149 Minnesota did not follow. Until recently, the
Minnesota Supreme Court had not ruled on what standard to a
ply, and this created inconsistencies in the courts' decisions.
However, in Goeb v. Tharaldson, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the Frye/Mack standard, not the Daubert standard, applies in de-
termining whether new scientific evidence is admissible." Essen-
tial to this discussion is not whether the court applies the Frye or
Daubert standard, but that, as with all other jurisdictions, Minnesota
courts have accepted the admittance of DNA evidence in criminal
procedures. 151
In 1989 the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the Frye stan-
dard specifically to the introduction of DNA evidence in a criminal
trial.' The holding in State v. Schwartz 54 is additionally significant
for two reasons. First, the court held that the admissibility of DNA
evidence, even if it meets the Frye/Mack standard, depends upon
the testing laboratory's compliance with standards and controls.
155
Second, the court affirmed the Kim limitation regarding statistical
probability evidence.1
56
149. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
150. Terry, supra note 146, at 241; Lorie Gildea, Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness
Testimony in Minnesota After the Daubert Tilogy, 26 WM. MIrCHELL L. REV. 93, 100-01
(2000). See generally Wesley v. Alexander, No. CO-96-613, 1996 WL 722084 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996) (avoiding the issue of Frye v. Daubert altogether); Ross v.
Schrantz, No. C8-94-1729, 1995 WL 254409, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 2,
1995) (holding Frye standard still governed in Minnesota).
151. 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000). For further discussion on the holding
reached in Goeb and its effect on Minnesota see Peter Knapp, The Other Shoe Drops:
Minnesota Rejects Daubert, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 997 (2000).
152. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 10, at 1. Minnesota
Statute section 634.25 provides that:
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis, as de-
fined in section 299C.155, are admissible in evidence without antecedent
expert testimony that DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable
method of identifying characteristics in an individual's genetic material
upon a showing that the offered testimony meets the standards for ad-
missibility set forth in the Rules of Evidence.
MINN. STAT. § 634.25 (1990).
153. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Minn. 1989) (holding admissibil-
ity of new scientific evidence is governed by Frye and DNA typing has gained gen-
eral acceptance). See also State v. Finney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 55 (Minn. 1989) (holding
electrophoretic typing of dried blood stains is admissible evidence under the
Mack/Frye standard because the relevant scientific community widely shares the
view that results from such testing are reliable and accurate).
154. 447 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Minn. 1989).
155. Id. at 428.
156. Id. at 429. The Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v. Joon Kyu Kim
20011 1991
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B. Requests For Post-Conviction DNA Testing
Requests for post-conviction relief are not a new phenomenon
to Minnesota courts.5 5 However, requests for post-conviction relief
based on DNA testing are new. In fact, Wayne v. State is one of the
few cases, if not the only case, where a defendant has even re-
quested post-conviction DNA testing. 15 It follows that there are no
cases in Minnesota where a convict has been exonerated based on
post-conviction DNA testing. Because Minnesota is not a death
penalty state, the issue of post-conviction DNA testing is not as
prevalent in Minnesota as it is in such states as Illinois and New
York. Even so, the Minnesota legislature has already adopted a stat-
ute to specifically address post-conviction DNA testing. This stat-
ute puts Minnesota ahead of many states in addressing post-
conviction DNA testing.
Minnesota has not been faced with the requests that New York
and Illinois have, so the courts have not had to address the proce-
dural implications associated with such a request. However, Wayne
may shed light on how the court would classify a request for post-
conviction DNA testing. In Wayne, the post-conviction court allowed
testing and in their opinion stated, "[D] NA testing only constitutes
that "a limitation on the use of population frequency statistics is necessary because
of the danger that such evidence will have a 'potentially exaggerated impact on
the trier of fact.'" 398 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 1987).
157. E.g., State v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407, 407 (Minn. 2000) (arguing in post-
conviction petition that fines and surcharges, imposed as part of the sentence,
were in violation of the excessive fines provisions of the federal and state constitu-
tions); King v. State, 562 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1997)(filing petition for post-
conviction relief did not entitle defendant to evidentiary hearing where he failed
to cite disputed facts); Miller v. State, 531 N.W.2d 491, 492-3 (Minn. 1995) (filing
of document titled "Ex Parte Application for Financial Assistance of Testing DNA
Evidence" was treated as request for post-conviction relief); Santiago v. State, 617
N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (bringing post-conviction motion claiming
trial court abused its discretion in various ways).
158. Wayne v. State, 601 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Minn. 1999).
159. MINN. STAT. § 590.01 Subd. la (1996) provides that:
Motion or fingerprint or forensic testing not available at trial. (a) A per-
son convicted of a crime may make a motion for the performance of fin-
gerprint or forensic DNA testing to demonstrate the person's actual in-
nocence if: (1) the testing is to be performed on evidence secured in
relation to the trial which resulted in the conviction; and (2) the evi-
dence was not subject to the testing because either the technology for the
testing was not available at the time of the trial or the testing was not
available as evidence at the time of trial.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01 subd. la (1996).
1992 [Vol. 27:3
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new evidence from the standpoint that it further confirms appel-
lant's guilt."'6° Because the court refers to the post-conviction test
results as "new evidence" it may suggest that that is how the court
intends to classify post-conviction DNA testing requests if presented
with such a request in the future.
Historically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed post-
conviction relief in cases where there is newly discovered evidence
that was not available at trial.16' Since the court referred to the
post-conviction DNA test results as "newly discovered evidence" the
groundwork is there for future requests to be classified in the same
manner.
Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has granted new
trials based on newly discovered evidence when the petitioner
makes a showing that the evidence could not have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence prior to trial; that at the time
of trial the petitioner and his counsel had no knowledge of such
evidence; the evidence cannot be doubtful, cumulative, or im-
peaching and that it would probably produce a result differentS162
from or more favorable than that which actually occurred. Evi-
dence that is not cumulative or impeaching essentially means that
the newly discovered evidence must be material. 11 Material evi-
dence can be defined as evidence where there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Reason-
able probability is defined as probability sufficient to undermine
160. Wayne, 601 N.W.2d at 441-42. The court was referring to the post-
conviction test results, which were consistent with the tests done during trial and
confirmed guilt. Id.
161. See generally State v. Gisege, 582 N.W.2d 229, 230 (Minn. 1998) (treating
motion for post-conviction DNA testing as petition for post-conviction relief under
MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subd. 1 (1996)); Miller v. State, 531 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Minn.
1995) (denying request for post-conviction relief because defendant's counsel had
access to testing at trial); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 588 (Minn. 1982)
(stating new trial may be granted based on newly discovered evidence if that evi-
dence was not available at trial).
162. Sutherlin v. State, 574 N.W.2d 428, 434 (Minn. 1998); Hodgson v. State,
540 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. 1995); Dale v. State, 535 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn.
1995); State v. Rainer, 502 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Minn. 1993); Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d at
588. See also Whitsel v. State, 525 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1994) (following a similar
standard).
163. Dale, 535 N.W.2d at 622.
164. Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1990).
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confidence in the outcome.161
It will be interesting to see how Minnesota courts address a re-
quest for post-conviction DNA testing in the future, how the court
will treat such a request procedurally, and, further, what the court
will do if the results prove to be exculpatory.
VI. WHAT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN To PREVENT MORE INNOCENT
PEOPLE FROM BEING WRONGFULLY CONVICTED?
A. Post-Conviction DNA Testing: Recommendations For Handling
Requests""
After the release of the U.S. Department of Justice Report, the
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence was estab-
lished.' 67 This commission was put together at the request of At-
torney General Janet Reno to "identify ways to maximize the value
of DNA in our criminal justice system." 16 The report outlines rec-
ommendations for prosecutors, defense counsel and judges on how
requests for post-conviction DNA testing should be handled. 69 Ac-
cording to Peter Neufeld, "the biggest problem with the report is
that they are only recommendations... [p]rosecutors don't have to
follow them if they don't want to." 70 However, it is a starting point
for those jurisdictions that do not have a statute mandating such a
procedure. The report also lays out each participant's role in the171
process. Furthermore, the report discusses the legal and biologi-
cal issues involved in a request for post-conviction testing, some of
which have been discussed above."'
165. Id.
166. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19.
167. Id. at v. The Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice of the Wis-
consin State Supreme Court, chairs the commission. Id. The commission is made
up of prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement, individuals from the scien-
tific community, individuals from the medical examiner community, academic
professionals and victims' rights organizations. Id.
168. Id. at iii.
169. Id.
170. Bailey, supra note 20. Approximately one-half of the cases overturned us-
ing DNA involve prosecutorial or police misconduct. Id.
171. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19.
172. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 177626, supra note 19, chapters 2, 3.
1994 [Vol. 27:3
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B. The Innocence Protection Act
Congress is also addressing the issue of post-conviction DNA
testing, specifically in situations involving the death penalty. Ver-
mont Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Innocence Protection
Act in Congress this year. The Innocence Protection Act would
give death row inmates the right to DNA tests.174 Specifically, to
tests that were not available at the time they were convicted due to
technology.1 7' Additionally, the Act seeks to apply DNA test results
to capital cases prosecuted before 1994. 17 This particular aspect of
legislation is especially important given the finality of sentencing an
innocent person to death.
Since the United States reinstated the death penalty in 1976,177
over 6,000 prisoners have been sentenced to death.171 "DNA evi-
dence is rising in importance as a tool to exonerate innocent in-
mates facing execution.' 79  Moreover, DNA testing, along with
growing concern that there are innocent people on death row, has• , • •180
decreased the public's support of capital punishment. Those
against the death penalty claim a reason most states do not already
have legislation in place to allow post-conviction testing is because
legislatures fear the time prisoners spend awaiting execution would
increase.
173. Chebium, supra note 104. The Innocence Protection Act appears to be
dead in its present form. James D. Polley, Innocence Protection Act, PROSECUTOR 16,
16 (Nov.-Dec. 2000). Senator Leahy is working to re-draft the bill. Id.
174. The Innocence Protection Act also includes provisions to increase federal
funds for state and local prosecutors involved in death penalty cases, discretionary
appellate and annual review processes and other procedural items intended to en-
sure defendants are granted fair access to the courts. Bipartisan Group of Senators
Seek Changes in Death Penalty Procedures, at http://www.cnn.com/ 2000/ ALLPOLI-
TICS/stories/06 /07/deathpenalty/index.html (June 7, 2000) [hereinafter Bipar-
tisan Group of Senators].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Montgomery, supra note 4. Thirty-eight states have the death penalty; the
twelve states that do not are: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wiscon-
sin. Raju Chebium, Reports of a Flawed Legal System Push Death Penalty Debate Into
High Gear, at http://www.cnn.com/LAW/trials.and.cases/case.files/0006/death
penalty/overview.html. [hereinafter Chebium, Reports of a Flawed Legal System].
178. Montgomery, supra note 4.
179. Chebium, supra note 104.
180. Bipartisan Group of Senators, supra note 174.
181. Chebium, supra note 104.
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C. Death Penalty Moratorium
Any time an innocent person is convicted and sentenced to
prison, our criminal justice system has failed. Any time an innocent
person is sentenced to die and executed, our criminal justice sys-
tem has failed miserably. At least the first situation allows an op-
portunity to correct the injustice. DNA testing has not only in-
creased awareness of its importance within the criminal justice
system, it has also raised questions about how these people were
wrongly convicted in the first place, especially those who received
the death penalty. Since the death penalty was reinstated, eighty-
five inmates have been proven innocent and released from death
row, thirteen releases occurred in Illinois alone. DNA evidence
played a key role in eight of those releases.
8
3
In the beginning of 2000, Illinois governor, George Ryan,• . • 184
banned all executions indefinitely. Illinois was the first state to
ban executions, but not the last. 8 Since Governor Ryan declared a
moratorium in Illinois, thirty-eight states have declared moratori-186
ums. Early this year, five Pennsylvania senators introduced Sen-
ate Bill 952, which would halt executions in Pennsylvania for two
years while a study is conducted. 87
D. Enactment of Statutes Long Overdue
Several state legislatures are working to develop statutes to ad-
dress requests for post-conviction DNA testing. In addition to the
moratorium in Illinois, the Illinois legislature passed a bill that
would require evidence in sex cases to be preserved for twenty-five• • 188
years and for seven years in all other felonies. Similarly, in June
182. Marcus Rediker, Public Forum to Examine Death Penalty and Proposed Morato-
rium, 2 NO. 6 LAW.J. 4, 4 (March 24, 2000). But see Chebium, supra note 104 (stat-
ing that eighty-seven death row inmates have been exonerated); Chebium, Reports
of a Flawed Legal System, supra note 177 (stating eighty-seven inmates have been re-
leased from death row).
183. Chebium, supra note 104.
184. Chebium, Reports of a Flawed Legal System, supra note 177.
185. Id.
186. Rediker, supra note 182, at 4.
187. Id. The study would look at whether race plays a role in sentencing one
to death, whether death-row inmates have adequate representation and whether
the death penalty is applied fairly and uniformly state wide. Id.
188. Amy Worden, Bill Would Preserve Murder Evidence Forever, at http://www.
apbnews.com/cjsystem/findingju.../evidence 0616_01.html (June 16, 2000). Gov-
1996 [Vol. 27:3
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of this year Senator Rodney Ellis, of Texas, introduced a bill that
would allow inmates to petition the court for post-conviction DNA
testing."'
New York has been at the forefront of post-conviction DNA
testing from the beginning. The latest efforts from New York in-
clude the establishment of the DNA Review Committee.9 0 Gover-
nor Pataki commissioned the committee to "investigate cases of
inmates locked up for crimes they claim they didn't commit."'91
The committee is expected to shape policies while maximizing the
use of DNA testing.
E. The Innocence Project
The Innocence Project is leading the crusade in the use of
post-conviction DNA testing to exonerate the innocent. Barry
Scheck and Peter Neufeld founded the Innocence Project in
1992.194 The Innocence Project is a clinical program that provides
pro bono legal assistance to inmates who are challenging their con-
victions."" Specifically, the Innocence Project focuses on using
196
DNA evidence to assist inmates in proving their innocence.
The Innocence Project is also involved in drafting legislation
that would make it easier for inmates to access post-conviction DNA
testing.' Specific elements of the proposed legislation include al-
Governor Ryan had until June 27, 2000, to sign the bill. Id.
189. Jim Yardley, Texas Lawmakers Seek Wide DNA Testing, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2000, at A18.
190. Joe Mahoney, Government DNA Crime Panel To Review Convictions, at
http://www.nydailynews.com/2000-05-08/News-andViews/Beyond-the-City/a-
65933. asp (May 8, 2000).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Chebium, supranote 104.
194. Cardozo Law Innocence Project, at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu
/innocence-project/index.html. The Innocence Project is based at Yeshiva Uni-
versity's Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York. Id. Neufeld and
Scheck are former public defenders from the South Bronx. Montgomery, supra
note 4. Additionally, Scheck and Neufeld co-chair the National Association of
Criminal and Defense Lawyers (NACDL) DNA Task Force. Wessling, supra note
36. Barry Scheck is a former member of O.J. Simpson's defense team. Montgom-
ery, supra note 4.
195. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
196. Bailey, supra note 20.
197. Cardozo Law Innocence Project, supra note 194. Peter Neufeld and Barry
Scheck also propose that the government pay for the post-conviction testing. Bai-
ley, supra note 20.
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lowing DNA testing in cases where the defendant will pay for the
DNA test out of his own pocket, doing away with the time limits on
new trials when DNA evidence has exculpatory potential, and pre-
serving biological evidence for as long as the inmate is in prison."'
Preservation of biological evidence is extremely important and a
hard issue to sell. "Prosecutors and state officials are under politi-
cal pressure to reduce crime, as well as those with a firm belief in
finality, may feel induced to destroy evidence as soon as the appeals
process is initially exhausted."' 99 The reality is that the Innocence
Project turns down about seventy percent of requests from inmates
due to the evidence being lost or destroyed.2 0
The numbers presented by the Innocence Project are alarming
because one wrongly convicted person is one too many. However,
the numbers also show just how far the Innocence Project has
come and what a difference they are making. For example, in 1995
the Innocence Project claimed they had exonerated eight prisoners
based on DNA.20' To date, the number of inmates the Innocence
Project has helped is substantially larger. Exactly how many inmates
the Innocence Project has helped exonerate to date varies, depend-
ing on the source. The number of inmates varies anywhere from
202thirty-eight to sixty-five inmates nationwide. Most cases involved a
situation where the DNA technology available today was not avail-
201able at the time of trial. Moreover, Neufeld and Scheck state that
every year since 1989, DNA results have excluded about twenty-five
204
percent of the FBI's primary suspects in sexual assault cases. The
198. Bailey, supra note 20.
199. Urs, supra note 11, at 316.
200. ABA Network, at http://www.dna testing in/journal/ may00/03ldna.html
201. Filocoma, supra note 2, at 567 n.20.
202. Bailey, supra note 20. But see Barfield, supra note 17, at 35 (stating DNA
analysis has exonerated forty-eight prisoners, including twelve on death row). An-
gels ofJustice reports the Innocence Project has represented thirty-eight individu-
als who have been exonerated based on DNA evidence. Montgomery, supra note
4. An article byJoe Mahoney states the Innocence Project has used DNA to free
sixty-four inmates. Mahoney, supra note 190. Yet another article addresses the
number in general terms stating the Innocence Project has helped free over three
dozen wrongly convicted inmates using DNA since 1992. Zitrin, supra note 36. The
Innocence Project is currently handling about 200 cases and has a backlog of
1,000 cases. Chebium, supra note 104.
203. Bailey, supra note 20.
204. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. 161258, supra note 10, at xxviii. For more
information, see ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIvE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER Dis-
PATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED, by Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld and Jim
1998 [Vol. 27:3
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/15
DNA TESTING TO INMATES
Innocence Project has clearly demonstrated DNA testing is a pow-
erful tool to exonerate those already convicted.
F Creation Of DNA Databanks
In 1994, Congress passed the DNA Identification Act.20 5 This
Act authorizes the attorney general to grant money to states to de-
206velop DNA databases. In order for a state to obtain grant money,
the state is required to collect DNA from felony sexual offenders.
In addition to the minimum requirement to collect DNA from fel-
ony sex offenders, states may require additional criminals to submit
to DNA testing to add to the databank. 208 The crimes to be in-
cluded and the specifics vary from state to state.209 The state of
Minnesota has the broadest approach because it does not state spe-
cifically what crimes should be included.210 This leaves the door
wide open. It is possible that at some point in time Minnesota will
Dwyer. ACTUAL INNOCENCE details the stories of ten men imprisoned after being
wrongfully convicted. See also Tanner, supra note 4.
205. Barfield, supra note 17, at 7.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 35.
209. Id. For example, Arkansas requires repeat offenders to submit to testing
and Wisconsin requires samples from each person who is incarcerated, on proba-
tion, paroled, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease. Id. Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi and Kentucky require samples from those arrested for sexual felony of-
fenses, but not necessarily convicted. Id.
210. Id. MINN. STAT. § 299C.09 (1999) provides that:
The bureau shall install systems for identification of criminals, including
the fingerprint system, the modus operandi system, the conditional re-
lease data system, and such others as the superintendent deems proper.
The bureau shall keep a complete record and index of all information
received in convenient form for consultation and comparison. The bu-
reau shall obtain from wherever procurable and file for record finger
and thumb prints, measurements, photographs, plates, outline pictures,
descriptions, modus operandi statements, conditional release informa-
tion, or such other information as the superintendent considers neces-
sary, of persons who have been or shall hereafter be convicted of a fel-
ony, gross misdemeanor, or an attempt to commit a felony or gross
misdemeanor, within the state, or who are known to be habitual crimi-
nals. To the extent that the superintendent may determine it to be neces-
sary, the bureau shall obtain like information concerning persons con-
victed of a crime under the laws of another state or government, the
central repository of this records system is the bureau of criminal appre-
hension in St. Paul.
MINN. STAT. § 299C.09 (1999).
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require those convicted of any crime to submit DNA samples. Al-
though this is an extreme scenario, it demonstrates the potential
for state DNA databanks. As a result of the databases holding more
and more DNA samples, DNA databanks will grow to be a powerful
a tool for law enforcement.
In fact, examples already exist of how important the DNA da-
tabanks can be in solving crimes and even in assisting to exonerate
the innocent. Florida claims to have made 200 "cold hits" and Vir-
ginia claims to have made seventy-eight cold hits using their respec-
tive DNA databases.21  Ronald Cotton was freed after DNA tests
212proved he was not the right man. Investigators found the right
man when DNA from the crime scene matched that of another
convict's DNA in the state's DNA database.213 Additionally, Clyde
Charles was released in December of 1999 after DNA tests showed
214he was wrongly convicted. As it turns out, his brother was guilty
of the crime. Marlo Charles' DNA was in the Virginia databank
216from a crime he committed in 1992. Police were able to match
his DNA stored in the databank to the semen taken from the vic-
tim.
21 7
In Minnesota, database searches have yielded results. In State v.
Bloom, the BCA prepared a DNA profile from the crime scene and
ran a search in the sex-offender DNA database, which identified
the defendant as a possible suspect.21" Bloom was convicted of first
degree burglary, first degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnap-
219ping. In State v. Perez, searches of the sex-offender DNA database
isolated the defendant as a suspect.22° As a result, the defendant
was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without
221
parole.
211. Bailey, supra note 20. A "cold hit" is when police have no leads and they
find a suspect by comparing the DNA profile found at the crime scene with DNA
profiles in the databases. Id.
212. Barfield, supra note 17, at 11.
213. Id.
214. Zitrin, supra note 36.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Minn. 1994).
219. State v. Bloom, No. C8-95-218, 1996 WL 33092, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
30, 1996).
220. State v. Perez, 516 N.W.2d 175, 176 (Minn. 1994).
221. Id. at 176.
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All of the state databases are in the process of being linked to a
national database called the National Combined DNA Identifica-
tion System ("CODIS") 222 Once this process is complete, the data-
bases will be all the more powerful to law enforcement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system has come a long way since allowing
DNA evidence in criminal proceedings. Scientific evidence has
come a long way since the genetic marker analysis of the 1960's.
Together, a powerful tool has been developed to incarcerate the
guilty and exonerate the innocent. With the number of innocent
individuals who have been convicted in recent years, there is no just
reason why our system should not take advantage of the scientific
advances afforded to our society in order to ensure that the right
person is convicted.
222. Barfield, supra note 17, at 7.
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